Gian Gentile

Colonel Gian P. Gentile is a US army officer and a history professor at the United States Military Academy.

Gentile is a prominent critic of the US military's approach to counterinsurgency.[1][2][3] He believes that the surge was not the primary cause of the post-2006 reduction in violence in Iraq, and effective counterinsurgency tactics were practiced by American troops in Iraq from 2003 on, rather than being introduced in 2006-7.[1][3][4] He further argues that the US military is now concentrating excessively on counterinsurgency, to the detriment of its capacity to fight conventional wars.[2] Following Andrew Bacevich, he believes that the prominence of counterinsurgency has led to an unrealistic view of the American military's power and capacity to change the world.[1]

Gentile graduated from UC-Berkeley, where he joined the ROTC, in 1986.[2][5] In 2000, he completed a PhD in history at Stanford University.[5] He served two tours in Iraq, first as the executive officer of a combat brigade in Tikrit in 2003 and then as the commander of the RSTA Squadron, 8-10 Cavalry, in a restive area of southwest Baghdad in 2006.[2]

Gentile has also written on air power: in 2001 NYU Press published his book How Effective is Strategic Bombing?,[6] which challenged the conclusions of the Strategic Bombing Survey.[7] Reflecting on Gentile’s work, the book review editor for The Journal of Conflict Studies wrote that “strategic bombing seems to have adapted itself nicely to the exigencies of democratic government; providing a way of waging limited war at arm's length, minimizing casualties on both sides of the conflict, and satisfying both domestic population and politician” but that “it is left to Gian Gentile… to pose the question US policy-makers should be asking: How effective is strategic bombing?”[8] The reviewer opined that “Gentile's answers are fresh because he... show(s) the reader that the question has rarely been answered honestly or even, in some cases, competently” and echoed Gentile’s central point that “the US Air Force among others has frequently, and sometimes purposely, failed to distinguish between the effects of strategic bombing and its effectiveness,” emphasizing that the “effects, physically observed and measured, are relatively easy to see and to report--and impress the public with,” but that “the effectiveness of same is wide open for debate.”[9]

Notes

  1. ^ a b c Ackerman, Spencer (6 March 2008). "The Colonels and ‘The Matrix’". Washington Independent. http://washingtonindependent.com/2067/the-colonels-and-the-matrix. Retrieved 15 April 2010. 
  2. ^ a b c d Dreazen, Yochi J. (7 April 2008). "Officer Questions Petraeus's Strategy". Wall Street Journal. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120753402909694027.html. Retrieved 15 April 2010. 
  3. ^ a b Raz, Guy (6 May 2008). "Army Focus on Counterinsurgency Debated Within". National Public Radio. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90200038. Retrieved 15 April 2010. 
  4. ^ Crowley, Michael (4 January 2010). "COIN Toss: The cult of counterinsurgency". The New Republic
  5. ^ a b The History Department at the United States Military Academy
  6. ^ Gian P. Gentile, How Effective is Strategic Bombing?: Lessons Learned from World War II to Kosovo. New York: New York University Press, 2001.
  7. ^ Book at NYU Press web site
  8. ^ Peter J. Woolley, review of How Effective is Strategic Bombing in The Journal of Conflict Studies (Winter 2001) pp. 168-169.
  9. ^ Peter J. Woolley, review of How Effective is Strategic Bombing in The Journal of Conflict Studies (Winter 2001) pp. 168-169.

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